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THE CASE FOR UTILIZING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AS A FORUM FOR GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULAnON
ANDREW L. STRAUSS·
I. INTRODUCTION
In his article,' Environmental Policy in the New World Economy, Alan
Miller discusses the environmental implications of globalization. 1
Recognizing that the flow of international private capital to developing
countries is far rnore significant than international developm.ent assistance,"
he questions how we can use public policy to maximize the positive
environ-mental effects of private investment.? Miller suggests the need to
find strate-gies that utilize market forces to benefit the environment." This
Article heeds Alan Miller's call by suggesting new approaches to thinking
about the potential for the World Trade Organization (WTO) to playa
positive environmental role.
This is a particularly salient issue today because one question that will
need resolution in the near future is which international regimes should
have primary responsibility for global environmental regulation. The
regimes being promoted as contenders to participate in global environm.ental
regulation include, among others, the United Nations Environment
Program., the specialized secretariats established under various
environmental treaties," and a newly proposed global environmental
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; B.A. 1981,
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; J.D., 1985, New York University School
of Law. I would like to thank Arthur Appleton and Marty Kotler for their very helpful
comments and criticisms. The ideas expressed in this article do not necessarily represent their
views. I wish to express my greatest appreciation to my research assistant, Jeanine Clark,
who provided invaluable assistance on this project.
1. Alan Miller, Environmental Policy in the New World Economy, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP.
J. 287 (1998).
2. Id. at 291.
3. Id. at 295-307.
4. Id.
5. A number of agreements provide for the establishment of a secretariat for the
administration of the treaty. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter United
Nations Framework Convention]; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No.
105-5 (1991), 28 I.L.M. 649 [hereinafter Basel Convention]; Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10C-I0, 26 I.L.M. 1541
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; see also Convention on the
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organization." Environm.entalists understandably might presum.e that the
substance of international environm.entallaw is m.ore im.portant than which
regim.e is given responsibility for administering such law. I will
dem.onstrate, however, that the choice of administrative regim.es can have
a major im.pact on the ability of the international conununity to negotiate
as well as enforce effective international agreem.ents.
In this Article, m.y specific concern is the role of the WTO {the successor
to the General Agreem.ent on Tariffs and 'Trade)" in regulating process and
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, art. IX, 19I.L.M. 15, 24
(providing for the establishment of a secretariat in the event that UNEP is no longer able to
serve in that capacity); Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10-541, art. 11, 18 I.L.M. 1442, 47 (establishing that Executive Secretary
to the Economic Commission for Europe shall be the Secretariat).
6. A recent U.S.-Japan study group has proposed the formation of a Global
Environmental Organization which would "work in tandem with the World Trade
Organization." Global Environment Group to Work with W7"O Part 0/Proposal by u.s.-Japan
Study Team, 7/15/97 lED 03 (BNA). In addition, individual commentators have suggested
the formation of a new global environmental organization. See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING
THE GAIT 275-81 (1994); Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing
Their Sovereign Rights? The GA ITDispute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL.
J.lNT'L & COMP. L. 161, 177 n. 88 (1996); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International
Relations Theory: An Analysis oftbe World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 909 (1995);
see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA IT, the Ie] & Trade-Environment
Disputes, 15 MICH. J. lNT'L L. 1043 (1994) (citing various statements by individuals advocating
the formation of a new global environmental organization or adjudicatory body); Richard
H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and W7"O: Regional
Trajectories 0/Rule Development, 91 AM. ].lNT'L L. 231, 237 (1997). Others have simply noted
that the trade-environment dilemma could best be addressed by an independent body
specifically formulated to deal with such issues. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade
Sanctions and the GA IT. An Analysis 0/ the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental
Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT' L L. & POL'y 751, 796 n.265 (1994).
7. For the reasons that follow, references in this Article to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are to that institution. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are to the treaty establishing the primary
rules governing international trade. The GAIT came into force in 1947. General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. It was
originally established as a multilateral arrangement to provide basic ground rules around
which post-war international trade could be organized. Id. Another supplemental
international agreement that was to provide the institutional structure for the international
trade regime was to follow. When this agreement never came into being-as a result of
opposition within the United States Congress-GAIT was alone left to meet the
administrative needs that the growth of international trade required. Rising to this challenge,
the GATT became a de/acto international organization. See generally KENNETH W. DAM,
THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970). As a
consequence of the conclusion of a massive trade agreement known as the Uruguay Round
in 1994, a de jure international trade organization, the WTO, finally came into being. See
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production methods (PPM'S).8 I make the argument that the organization
would be a uniquely effective forum for coordinating and enforcing
harmonized global standards in such areas as clean air, clean water,
hazardous waste, occupational health and safety, and natural resource
preservation.
Before developing my case, two a priori questions need to be briefly
addressed because of their continuing controversy. The first is whether
there is a reason why environmental regulation should take place on a global
scale." The environmental impact of economic activity was traditionally
considered to be limited to where industrial production occurred or
products were consumed, and hence was not thought to be a valid subject
for global regulation, The emergence of global environmental problems
such as ozone depletion and global warming;'? and the growing realization
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
Today, the WTO is the organization which administers the trading rules contained in the
GATT as well as rules prescribed by several other related agreements. Id.
8. The OECD defines PPM's as standards that:
specify criteria for how a product is manufactured, harvested or taken.
They encompass emission and effluent standards, certain performance or
operations standards, and practices prescribed for natural resource
sectors. Terms such as "made with," "produced by" and "harvested by"
signify a PPM standard. . .. All PPM standards apply to the production
stage, i.e. before a product is placed on the market for sale. These
standards specify criteria for how a product is produced or processed.
However, the PPM standard may address the environmental effects of a
product all during its life-cycle, i.e., effects which may emerge when the
product is produced, transported, consumed or used, and disposed of.
Typology of Trade Measures Based on Environmental Product Standards and PPM Standards:
Note by the Secretariat, Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts, OECD
Environment Directorate and Trade Directorate, COM/ENVlTD 89 (Sept. 28-30, 1993).
9. For an expanded explanation as to why I believe that there is such a need for global
regulation in these areas, see Andrew L. Strauss, From Gattzella to the Green Giant: Winning
the Environmental Battlefor the Soul ofthe World Trade Organization, _ U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. LAW_ (forthcoming 1998).
10. The global environmental problems that have most prominently come to the
public's attention include the depletion of the ozone layer of the earth's atmosphere due to
the globally diffused environmental release of chlorofluorocarbons and other chemicals and
the warming of the earth's temperature due to the aggregate effect of the world-wide release
of greenhouse gasses. See generally COMMITfEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC
POLICY, POLICY lMPLICAnONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING (1992) (analyzing panel findings
of the effects of greenhouse gases and reviewing policy proposals); THE EARTH AS
TRANSFORMED By HUMAN ACTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CHANGES IN THE
BIOSPHERE OVER THE PAST 300 YEARS (B.L. Turner II et al. eds. 1990) (analyzing the
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that the global environment is in a general sense ecologically interconnected,
has made the need for global environmental regulation increasingly clear.
Assuming the need for global environmental regulation, the second and
m.ore controversial a priori question is whether the WTO should, consistent
with its overall trade mission, wear the mantle of global environmental
regulator. 11 Briefly, one of the primary purposes of the WTO is to create
a level playing field upon which international trade can take place.F As is
"impacts of human activities on the 'faces and flows' of the global environment over the past
three centuries or so."); DONALD G. KAUFMAN & CECILIA M. FRANZ, BIOSPHERE 2000:
PROTECTING OUR GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (1993) (discussing ozone levels, deforestation and
other environmental problems).
11. For a more detailed discussion of the convergence between trade and environmental
policy and for my more comprehensive views as to why this convergence justifies
environmental regulation by the WTO, see Strauss, supra note 9.
12. The essential mission of the World Trade Organization is to encourage the creation
of a level playing field whereby governments refrain from pursuing policies that disadvantage
imports from foreign countries either in favor of domestically produced goods or in favor of
goods produced in other foreign countries. See Marsha A. Echols, Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 191
(Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1996); seealso David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction
to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 19 (1995);
Ernst-Ulric Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 398, 433 (1997). The intellectual inspiration for this mission came out of the
economic theory of comparative advantage originally advanced by the 18th century
economist David Ricardo. THE WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 128-41 {p. Strafa ed., 1975). According to Ricardo's theory, if trade barriers
between nations are removed, each will come to produce what it can produce comparatively
most efficiently and the greatest sum total of world production will occur. Id. See generally
John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1231, 1243 (1992) (providing a contemporary overview of
Ricardo's theory).
The primary articles of the GATT that embody this overall mission are Article I
(Most Favored Nation provision requiring that countries do not discriminate in international
trade as between foreign nations); Article III (National Treatment provision requiring that
countries do not discriminate in favor of domestic industry and against foreign producers in
establishing or applying domestic regulations); Article XI (restricting the use of quantitative
restrictions (quotas) on the import of foreigngoods), See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, supra note 7, arts. I, ill, XI, U.N.T.S. at 187 incorporated in, Final Act, supra note 7)
at 1125. For a more extensive discussion of the obligations of the GATT and the relevant
exceptions, see generally Matthew H. Hurlock, Note, The GA IT, U.S. Law and the
Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GA IT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 2098 (1992) (reviewing the GATT's environmental provisions and their
conflicts with u.S. law); Rex J. Zedalis, A Theory of the GA IT ~~Like»Product Common
Languages Cases, 27VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 33 (1994) (discussing extensively the obligations
of the GATT and the relevant exceptions).
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well known, this playing field can become uneven when some countries
provide domestic producers with a competitive advantage over foreign pro-
ducers'? by establishing relatively lax environmental standards.l" Assigning
the organization the task of eliminating this competitive advantage through
the oversight of global environmental standards is well within the overall
trade mandate of the WTO. In addition, because of the increasing use of
trade restrictive measures in multilateral environmental agreem.ents,
environmental regulation has already come to inhabit the domain regulated
by the WTO. For example, the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species requires members to prohibit importation of certain
endangered or threatened species" even though such a prohibition is
13. See generally Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic
Incentives and Biodiversity Conservation in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 71
(1996); Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental Standards: The Level-Playing-
Field Dimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1996); Nancy Kubasek et al., Protecting
Marine Mammals: Time for a New Approach, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 1, 18 (1995)
(discussing the phenomena of countries seeking a competitive advantage by weakening
environmental standards); and C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental
Regulations: The New NontariffBarriers, 11 NW.J. INT'LL. & Bus. 47 (1990) (examining the
disparity between the environmental regulatory and enforcement policies of developed and
developing countries).
14. For an explanation as to why I do not believe that allowing countries to maintain
relatively low environmental standards should be considered a legitimate way of creating a
comparative advantage, see Strauss, supra note 9. My view, however, is not universally
accepted. Some commentators consider relaxed environmental standards to be a legitimate
way of creating a comparative advantage. See Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and Environment:
How Should WTO Panels Review Environmental Regulations Under GA ITArticles III and
XX?, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 441, 470-71 (1996); Eric Phillips, World Trade and the
Environment: The CAFE Case, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827, 838 (1996).
15. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. For further discussion of the trade
implications of the convention, see Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade
System: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 175, 193,206 (1996). Several other major environmental treaties
also specifically provide for the use of trade restrictions to accomplish the goals of the treaty.
See Basel Convention, supra note 5, at 662-63; and Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, at 1552-
54. "In addition, two recent treaties, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United
Nations Framework Convention, incorporate or envision the use of trade measures." Chris
Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GA IT: Conflict and Resolutioni; 26
ENVTL. L. 841,844 (1996) (citing Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
818 (1992)); and Convention on Climate Change, supra note 5, at 854-55. Other
environmental instruments utilizing trade restrictions include the South Pacific Forum: Final
Act of the Meeting on a Convention to Prohibit Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific,
Including Text of Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the
South Pacific and its Protocols, Nov. 24, 1989, 29I.L.M. 1449 (1990); Association of South
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probably in current violation of the trade privileges that exporters of
endangered species enjoy as members of the WTO. 16 Finally, international
trade rules are implicated when countries resort to unilaterial trade
restrictions to remedy what they perceive to be offshore environmental
infractions. 17 This fusion between trade and environmental regulation
rneans that a coherent international environmental regime demands SOIne
role for the WTO. The only open question is just how central that role
should be. 18
East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
reprinted in 15 ENVTL. POL'y & L. 64 (1985); International Code of Conduct on the
Distribution and Use of Pesticides, 23 FAO/CONFIRES 10/85 (Nov. 1989); and Agreement
on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 8409, 27 U.S.T. 3922.
16. This conflict is not limited to the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species. Generally speaking, WTO members who become parties to
environmental agreements with trade restricting provisions potentially face conflicting
obligations. See PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY
(1993); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459, 491 (1994). Where enforcement of a multilateral environmental
agreement results in trade restrictions against a member of the WTO that is not a party to the
Multilateral Environmental Agreement, the potential for conflict is exacerbated. Seegenerally
Hudnall, supra note 15, at 175.
17. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
18. Some of the areas about which I am proposing that the WTO playa regulatory role,
such as domestic water quality standards, have as of yet not been the subjects of sustained
state sanctioned efforts to create multilateral agreements on global standards. Others, such
as the release of air borne effluents, have been the subject of various types of multilateral
discussions and, in some cases, agreements. See Convention on Climate Change, supra note
5, at 855-59; Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, at 1547-48; United Nations: Protocol tothe
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of
Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991,
31 I.L.M. 568; see also United Nations: Protocols to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, July 8, 1985, 27 I.L.M. 698 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1987).
Despite the overlap between trade and environmental policy, the World Trade
Organization has not thus far served as a forum for the negotiation or implementation of the
global environmental agreements that do exist. WTO negotiation and implementation of
treaty provisions with environmental implications has been limited to Articles ill and XX
of the GATT and the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Conditions, all of which seek to restrict the ability of states to prescribe environmental
regulations with the potential to impact international trade. See Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Apr. 15, 1994. For further discussion
of the trade implications of these provisions, see Christine M. Cuccia, Note, Protecting Ani-
mals in the Name ofBiodiversity: Effects ofthe Uruguay Round ofMeasures Environmental
Agreementsures RegulatingMethods ofHarvesting, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 481,488 (1995); infra note
30; seealso Steinberg, supra note 6 at 231 (discussing WTO's environmental mandate as limit-
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The WTO has not yet offered any positive contribution to global
environmental protection. Additionally, powerful political forces oppose
the WTO entering the environmental arena. Clearly, making
environmental progress within the framework of the WTO will be
extremely difficult. Without denying this political reality, I nevertheless
wish to demonstrate that the organization's unique attributes give it
significant, though within the environmental conununity largely
unackriowledged.V potential as a global environmental regulatory forum.
By way of examining this potential, I will first, in Part II, present the
benefits of utilizing the WTO as a forum for the creation of environmental
law, In Part ill, I will then proceed to describe the advantages of utilizing
the WTO as a forum for the administration and enforcement of such laws.
II. UTILIZING THE W ORLO TRADE ORGANIZATION TO NEGOTIATE
lNTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
To date, the governments of developing countries have been extremely
ed to the Committee on Trade and the Enviromnent and the Committees that administer the
agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Conditions).
19. Assuming that the World Trade Organization's failure to positively contribute to
global environmental concerns is reflective of the organization's intrinsic nature, environmen-
talists have tended to emphasize the organization's problems rather than its unique potential.
In a typical example, recalling the Tuna/Dolphin controversy, David Phillips of Earth Island
Institute wrote "the dolphins now have become the warning light on what GAlT has in store
for health and the environment." David Phillips, Dolphins and GA IT, in THE CASE
AGAINST "FREE TRADE:" GAlT, NAFTA AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE
POWER 133 (RALPH NADER ET AL., EDS. 1993). For a brief discussion of the Tuna-Dolphin
controversy, see infra note 30; see also Dunoff, supra note 6 at 1046.
Also reflecting the generally pessimistic view that many environmentalists have
toward the future impact of the World Trade Organization was a piece in The Guardian by
James Erliclunan:
H you don't give a damn that dolphins die in their thousands in tuna nets,
it's your lucky day. H you think anti-fur campaigners are pathetic, the
world is moving in your direction. . .. Free trade forces look set to rout
animal and human welfare campaigns worldwide now that the full
impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime has begun to
emerge.
James Erliclunan, A Hard Price for Free Trade, THE GUARDIAN, May 13, 1997, at T17.
While such rejectionist postures are common, some environmentalists have also
proposed constructive reforms, which they argue would make the WTO a more even-handed
arbiter of trade-environmental issues. See Anna Beth Snoderly, Comment, Clearing the Air:
Environ-mental Regulation, Dispute Resolution, and Domestic Sovereignty Under the World
Trade Or-ganization, 22 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 241,247 (1996); Wold, supra note 15,
at 915-19.
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reluctant to sign onto the few relatively2° modest global environmental
agreements that have been negotiated." These governments have been
jealously guarding their discretion to maintain comparatively weak domestic
environmental standards. As mentioned, such relaxed standards allow these
governments countries to gain competitive trade advantagesf over more
highly regulated developed countries by reducing environmental compliance
costs that must be borne by local industry.23
Moreover, incentives for developing countries to participate in many
global environmental agreements are undermined by the classic free-rider
problem." Every country facing a global environmental problem has an
incentive to stand aside and allow other countries to bear the costs of
complying with remedial agreements, while reaping its share of global
environmental benefits for free. Democratic developed countries with
relatively influential environmental movements and more stringent
environrnental lawsv tend to be the ones promoting global environmental
20. "There is an abundance of global, regional, and local declarations and conferences
dealing with environmental protection in general. [However,] [flew binding norms have
emerged." WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION 263 (2d ed. 1991). See generally Edith Brown Weiss, International
Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence ofa New World Order, 81 GEO.
L.J. 675 (1993) (outlining some of the major international environmental agreements).
21. See generally Bing Ling, Developing Countries and Ozone Layer Protection: Issues,
Principles and Implications, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.]. 91 (1992) (noting some reasons for developing
country resistance to Multilateral Environmental Agreements); A. Dan Tarlock, Safe
Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 233, 254
(1997) (specifically identifying lack of financial capacity as a developing country justification
for nonadherence to Multilateral Environmental Agreements); and Jeff Trask, Montreal
Protocol Noncompliance Procedure: The Best Approach to Resolving International
Environmental Disputesi, 80 GEO. L.]. 1973, 1975 (1992) (identifying nonadherence as
resulting from a lack of funds and technology).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
23. Carl F. Schwenker, Note, Protecting the Environment and U.S. Competitiveness in
the Era ofFree Trade: A Proposal, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1355, 1369 (1993) (drawing the connection
between stringency of standards and rigorousness of enforcement on the one hand and
compliance costs on the other); seealso Robert Housman et al., Enforcement ofEnvironmental
Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 593, 597 (1993) (noting cost savings resulting from non-compliance
with environmental standards where enforcement is lax).
24. For a background discussion of the free-rider problem, see generally MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1971); and PHILIP D. STRAFFIN, GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY 139-44 (1993).
25. See C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: W'hy the
NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH.]. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 103 (1994) (stating that
developed countries have the highest environmental standards and the most stringent
enforcement policies). Although developing nations often lag far behind the developed world
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agreements." There are, however, m.any more developing countries in the
world, and because adherence to international treaty regim.es is voluntary,
these countries need not participate.
The WTO, at present, provides the ideal and probably only global
organizational vehicle with the institutional capability to independently
induce countries to participate in international environm.ental agreements."
In the WTO, with m.inim.al exceptions, all countries are required to comply
with the related agreern.ents governed by the organization.P Integrating
in terms of environmental regulation and enforcement, some progress has been made in
recent years. See Barbara A. Boczar, Toward a Viable Environmental Regulatory Framework:
From Corporate Environmental Management to Regulatory Consensus, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 291,
319 (1994); Schwenker, supra note 23, at 1366-67.
26. Among developed nations, some countries are generally inclined to push harder for
meaningful global accords than are others. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation
and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2052 (1993).
Once environmental treaty regimes are established, developed nations do not always
do everything necessary to implement the goals or mandates of Multilateral Environmental
Agreement. Seegenerally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Success ofInternational
Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995) (noting several examples of
developed nations' actions which are either not in compliance with Multilateral
Environmental Agreement or while in compliance, demonstrate a lack of commitment to
the environment).
Developing countries, in certain cases, have been advocates for environmental
agreements. See C. Russell H. Shearer, International Environmental Law and Development
in Developing Nations: Agenda Setting, A rticulation, and Institutional Participation, 7 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 391, 397 (1994) (noting the concern of certain developing, low lying coastal
nations regarding global warming); seegenerally Green Group Backs Move for Broader Timber
Pact, THE REUTER EUROPEAN BUSINESS REPORT, May 10, 1993 (developing nations were
among those pushing for sustainable felling of both tropical and temperate forests); and
Farhan Haq, Disarmament: u.N. Meet Will Test Nuclear Commitments, Groups Say, INTER
PRESS SERV., Apr. 3, 1997(developing countries outraged by nuclear testing are now pushing
for "nuclear elimination").
27. Presently, the promise of international financial transfers has been the only major
inducement available to secure the participation of most developing countries in most
Multilateral Environmental Agreements. See William Wilson, Environmental Law as
Development Assistance, 22 ENVTL. L. 953, 966 (1992) (discussing the use of development
assistance to developing countries to secure environmental cooperation); Revisiting Rio, J.
COM., June 18, 1997, at 6A (arguing that the pervasive linking of development assistance to
developing countries to environmental reforms has been ineffective). See also John
Ntam.birweki, The Developing Countries in the Evolution ofan International Environmental
Law, 14 HASTINGS INT~L & COMP. L. REV. 905, 911-16 (1991) (noting that technology
transfers playa supplem.ental role in inducing developing countries to accept Multilateral
Environmental Agreements).
28. Under the old GAIT system (see supra note 7 for an explanation of GAIT as prior
trade system), members had the option of participating in several specialized but important
trade arrangements. Jackson, supra note 12, at 1227, 1271. As a result of the Uruguay Round,
318 Widener Law Symposium Journal [Vol. 3:309
global environmental agreements into the framework of the WTO would
therefore ensure the adherence of the 133 member countries that wish to
maintain the significant benefits that membership otherwise provides.
Because of their recognition of the significance of "losing the battle" at the
WTO, developing countries have been steadfast about keeping serious
environmental issues out of the WTO. Working through a specialized
WTO conunittee established to deal with trade and environmental issues,
the Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE), these countries have
worked diligently and successfully to keep the WTO's agenda free of
significant environrnental irritiatives.P
As a result of this and other frustrations'? at the WTO, 1llany
membership in the WTO became largely an "all or nothing" proposition. Echols, supra note
12;-Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World
Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 358 (1995); and David W. Leebron, An Overview of the
Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 18 (1995). The Agreement
Establishing The World Trade Organization states, "The agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 ... are integral parts of this Agreement, binding
on all Members." Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 18, art.
II, para. 2 (emphasis added). The exceptions to the "all or nothing" character of WTO
membership are several highly sector specific "Plurilateral Agreements," which are only
binding on those members who have accepted the agreements. Id. at para. 3. See Final Act,
supra note 7. The Plurilateral agreements include the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,
the Agreement on Government Procurement, the International Dairy Agreement, and the
International Bovine Multilateral Environmental Agreement Agreement. Id.
29. See Adrienne Fox, The Next Big Battle Over Trade, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec.
19, 1996, at Al (explaining that developing countries had "banded together at the WTO to
block most of the green agenda," and that these countries were pleased by the failure of the
WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment to promote an environmental mission for
the organization). For further press accounts documenting developing country opposition
to WTO environmental initiatives and the success of that opposition, see also Green Activist,
Sweden Slam lVTO on Environmental Foot-dragging, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Dec. 10, 1996; and
Richard Lawrence, Clinton Pressed to Revive Free-Trade Initiatives: APEC, lVTO Officials
Urge Strong Message, J. COM., Oct. 31, 1996, at 2A.
30. Also disappointing environmentalists, (see supra note 29) existing GATT treaty
provisions have been interpreted by WTO adjudicative bodies, (see infra notes 44-49 and
accompanying text (discussing adjudicative bodies», as not allowing unilateral trade
restrictions whose purpose is to protect the offshore environment. See Dunoff, supra note
6, at 1051-58. See also Cuccia, supra note 18, at 489; and Wold, supra note 15, at 845. For my
own discussion of the problems with allowing nations to remedy offshore environmental
infractions by unilaterally imposing restrictions on the import of foreign goods, see Strauss,
supra note 9.
The so-called Tuna-Dolphin disputes between the United States and Mexico and the
United States and the European Union resulted in the two primary WTO panel decisions
dealing with whether states can unilaterally restrict trade to protect offshore environmental
resources. These disputes centered around whether the United States could restrict the
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environmentalists have concluded that the organization is intrinsically
unfriendly to environmental concernsr" In response, some American
environmentalists argue that the United States should leave the
organization.Y Others argue that environmental regulation should be left
to other organizations.P Giving primary responsibility for environm.ental
regulation to other organizations whose m.andates are prim.arily
environmental makes sense for a variety of reasons. For the reasons I have
stated, however, such responsibilities should be constitutionally coordinated
with the WTO's negotiation process. It is worth keeping in mind that the
fierceness of the opposition to allowing the WTO to become a forum. for
import of foreign tuna that were caught in ways that endangered large numbers of dolphins.
See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839, 848-49 Oune
1994). The panel opinions in both the Mexican and EU cases differed only slightly. Both
panels concluded that because the dolphins to be protected were outside of U.S. jurisdiction,
the restrictions were in conflict with the GATT obligations of the United States. Id. Most
recently, a WTO panel similarly ruled that U.S. legislation restricting the import of foreign
shrimp is contrary to U.S. obligations under the GATT. The shrimp targeted by the
challenged U.S. legislation are caught outside U.S. waters in ways that kill a large number of
endanged sea turtles. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Complaint Concerning Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998).
For other major environmentally unfavorable rulings by WTO dispute resolution
bodies, see Report of the 1997 Panel on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/OS26/RiUSA, Aug. 18,1997; and WTO Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 29, 1996,35 I.L.M. 274. For a more detailed discussion of several
of the key GATT decisions relating to environmental measures, see generally, EsTY, supra
note 6, at 265-74 (providing an overview of GATT cases relating to the environment);
Cynthia M. Maas, Should the WTO Expand GA IT Article xx· An Analysis of United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,S MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
415 (1996).
31. See supra note 19.
32. Individuals and environmental groups have advocated U.S. withdrawal from the
WTO. See Alan Kovski, U.S. Appeals WTO Gasoline Ruling; Critics Doubt Prospects, OIL
DAILY, Feb. 22, 1996, at 3. See also U.S. Coalition Decries WTO Gasoline Finding, REUTERS
FINANCIAL SERVICE, Feb. 21, 1996 (Lori Wallach, of Public Citizen, proclaiming "[w]hat the
U.S. needs to do is just get out of the WTO....").
33. Commentators have stated that even if environmentally friendly reforms were
instituted, the WTO would still not be an appropriate forum for addressing global
environmental issues. See Dunoff, supra note 6, at 1066; Peter Gill, New Green View Needed
to Save Trade-Study-Trade and Exporting, AUSTL. FINANCIAL REV., Dec. 21, 1994, at P23
(reviewing a paper by Jane Drake-Brockman and Professor Kym Anderson that
acknowledged the possible need for a global environmental organization); see also Alberto
Bernabe-Riefkohl, To Dream the Impossible Dream: Globalization and Harmonization of
Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205 (1995).
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global environmental regulation is not a function of the organization's
limitations as a potential forum for global environmental regulation, but
rather it is likely strength. Given the relative influence of both the
environmental movement and its adversaries, winning the battle to create
globalized environmental production standards will not be easy wherever
it is fought. The rewards, however, of winning the WTO prize are likely
to be conunensurate with the effort.
ill. UTll..IZING THE W ORLO TRADE o RGANIZAnON TO ADMINISTER
AND ENFORCE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
In addition to its ability to gain widespread accession to global
environm.ental agreem.ents, the WTO is uniquely capable of ensuring that
states comply with any obligations thus incurred. To fully appreciate this
advantage requires an understanding of the general limitations of the
international system, As David Hodas's contribution to this symposium has
made clear, enforcing compliance with domestic environmental law is very
problematic and dem.anding of creative solutions." I am. sure he would agree
that the difficulties of securing com.pliance are, if anything, even more
daunting internationally.
The classic pzoblem of compelling international compliance centers on
the lack of centralized adjudication and enforcement mechanisms similar to
those the courts and national regulatory bureaucracies offer within the
domestic system. Professor Richard Falk identified the adjudication
problem. in his classic 1964 article, The Adequacy ofContemporary Theories
ofInternational Law-Gaps in Legal Thinking. 35
Among the most serious deficiencies in international law is the frequent
absence of an assured procedure for the identification of a violation . . .. The
status of controverted behavior as legal or illegal is quite problematical, ...
because no central institutions exist to make judgments that will be treated as
authoritative by states. . .. The consequence is that the international system
frequently lacks the means to determine definitely that certain behavior
constitutes a violation of the law ....
This problem has deep, as well as obvious consequences. The obvious
consequence is a conclusion that, since there is no assured way to identify
what is forbidden, everything is permitted. For how can international law
claim to be a system of restraint if it lacks a means to identify transgressionsr'"
34. See generally David Hodas, The Role ofLaw in Defining Sustainable Development:
NEPA Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (1998).
35. Richard A. Falk, The Adequacy ofContemporary Theories ofInternational Law-Gaps
In Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 249-50 (1964).
36. Falk's indictment of the decentralized nature of the international dispute system
is not absolute. Id. at 250. He goes onto explain:
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While the lack of international adjudicative machinery clearly constitutes a
significant impediment to compliance, as Falk implies, the international
system does occasionally have limited capabilities to adjudicate select
disputes. For example, the International Court of Justice has the capacity
to decide certain disputes between states.Y
Even at those relatively rare times when the system is institutionally
This question, far from suggesting the irrelevance of international law,
points toward a better understanding of its function and purpose. For,
although rules of restraint are the core of the system, their influence is
often realized by a combination of self-restraint and reconciliation. A
state bureaucracy refrains, under routine circumstances, from violating
rules and approaches them in a spirit of impartiality. Once it is alleged
that restraints have been broken, the extent of adherence to applicable
rules has a great bearing upon the response of the complaining party.
Therefore, the degree and manner of violation may be more crucial than
the fact of violation. The possibility of degrees of violation must be
introduced explicitly into international legal theory. There is a need for
an image of compliance and violation that draws inspiration from the
idea of a spectrum or a prism, rather than insists upon a rigid dichotomy
between legal or illegal conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. The United Nations Charter describes the International Court of Justice as "the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations." See U.N. CHARTER, art. 92. Under Article
36 of its statute, the International Court of Justice is competent to hear disputes by special
ad hoc agreement between disputing nations or as mandated by terms in specific treaties
referring disputes to the Court. The Court is also empowered under the so-called optional
clause of Article 36 to exercise jurisdiction over a state, who pursuant to a declaration
delivered to the Court has generally submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court, subject to any
limitations included in its declaration as long as the applicant party pursuant to its declaration
could itself also be subject to such jurisdiction. See STAT. INT. CT. OF JUST., art. 36 sees 2, 5.
The vast majority of disputes between states never find their way to the International
Court of Justice. Most are resolved by diplomatic means. Many are never resolved. Some
international disputes are referred to arbitrational tribunals that are established by the parties
on an ad hoc basis to hear particular disputes. Pursuant to various treaties, other disputes are
referred to more specialized international tribunals. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 186, 187, Annex VI, 21 I.L.M. 1261; Intergovernmental Conference
on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea: Final Documents, Nov. 13, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046
U.N.T.S. 138 (1977), 11 I.L.M. 1294 (entered into force Aug. 30, 1975); see also Final Act of
the European Energy Charter Conference, Dec. 12, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 373, 380 (1995);
International Coffee Agreement,June 30, 1983, art. 58, T.I.A.S. NO. 11095, at 62-3 (entered
into force Sept. 11, 1985).
In the human rights area specifically, there are important specialized tribunals with
the capacity to decide cases. These include the European Court of Human Rights,
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
Europ. T.S. No.1.; Organization of American States: Statute of Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, May 1980, 19 I.L.M. 634.
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capable of authoritatively identifying infractions, a secondary hurdle to
securing state compliance with international law exists. The international
system usually remains incapable of taking remedial action against
recalcitrant parties.P While the inability of most adjudicative (as well as
other international bodies) to directly enforce com.pliance with their
decisions is less detrimental" than 1llany people assurnef it nevertheless
38. The International Court, for example, has no mechanism for directly enforcing its
decisions. The United Nations Security Council is legally empowered to enforce the Court's
decisions under Article 94. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 94. The Council has, however, never
utilized this power. See Jonathan I. Charney, Compromissory Clauses and theJurisdiction of
the International Court ofJustice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855, 860 (1987). Other international
dispute resolution institutions, likewise have no ability to directly compel parties to comply
with their decisions. See supra note 37 (discussing other international dispute resolution
institutions). For a discussion of enforcement problems typically faced by international
tribunals, see generally R.P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1969).
39. In actual fact, states quite often do follow international law, despite the frequent
absence of the types of formal enforcement mechanisms found in domestic law. This
observation was perhaps most famously made by Louis Henkin:
Violations of law attract attention and the occasional important violation
is dramatic; the daily, sober loyalty of nations to the law and their
obligations is hardly noted. It is probably the case that almost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all ofthe time. Every day nations respect the borders
of other nations, treat foreign diplomats and citizens and property as
required by law, observe thousands of treaties with more than a hundred
countries.
LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (1979)(emphasis
in original).
The force of international opinion and the natural inclination of state bureaucracies to
follow cules are factors often pointed to by international scholars as explaining why states
often times do comply with international law.
40. The 19th century thinker John Austin is most often associated with the school of
thought that holds that international law's usual lack of traditional enforcement mechanisms
is so significant as to be fatal to its status as law:
Laws properly so called are a species of commands. But, being a
command, every law properly so called flows from a determinate source
.... [W]henever a command is expressed or intimated, one party signifies
a wish that another shall do or forbear: and the latter is obnoxious to an
evil which the former intends to inflict in case the wish be disregarded.
. .. [E]very sanction properly so called is an eventual evil annexed to a
command . . .. And hence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining
between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a
given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its
author. As I have already intimated, the law obtaining between nations
is law (improperly so called) set by general opinion. The duties which it
imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations,
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remains a very reallirnitation of the international system."! The WTO,
however, is unusual in that it has evolved both highly developed
adjudicative and enforcement mechanisms.V Resort to this body to ensure
compliance with international environmental agreements would, therefore,
uniquely allow for both compliance hurdles to be overcome,
The WTO's adjudicative mechanisms are established in several key
provisions of the "Dispute Settlement Understanding" that arose out of the
Uruguay Round Agreements." The Dispute Settlement Understanding
or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and
incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally
received and respected.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCEDETERMINED 133, 201 (1832) (Berlin et
ale eds., 1954).
41. Compliance, for example, with the decisions of the International Court of Justice
has been mixed. See Gary L. Scott et al., Recent Activity Before the International Court of
Justice: Trend or Cyclei, 3 ILSAJ.!NT'L & COMP. L. 1, 10 (1996) (reporting that of the cases
reviewed between 1963 and 1985, a significant number were flaunted by the losing party);
and EDWARD MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN
TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1987) (observing that the record of the Court in
cases where the responding party was compelled to accept its jurisdiction under the optional
clause of Article 36 "is a series of denials, revocations, or reservations of jurisdiction,
nonappearances before the court, and refusals to comply with court directives."). For a
discussion of Article 36, see supra note 37. See also Heidi K. Hubbard, Separation ofPowers
Within the United Nations: A Revised Rolefor the International Court ofJustice, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 165, 173-78 (1985); David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect ofthe Jurisprudence ofthe
International Court ofJustice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 435, 448
(1996). The most notorious example in recent memory of the inability of the court to
enforce compliance with its decisions was the case of Nicaragua v. United States, 1986I.C.J.
14 Oune 27, 1986). The United States contested the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate
claims by Nicaragua alleging U.S. responsibility for illegally mining a port as well as engaging
in other illicit activities. After the court accepted jurisdiction, the United States refused to
appear before it to argue on the merits. See STATEMENT OF LEGAL ADVISOR OF STATE
DEPARTMENT, Abraham D. Sofaer, to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dec. 4, 1985, 86
Dept. St. Bull. 67, 70-71 (No. 2106, Jan 1986). For other instances of nonappearance, see
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Non-Appearance Before the International Court of[ustice, 33 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41(1995); Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory
Jurisdiction: The Casefor Closing the Clause, 81 AM. J. !NT'L L. 57, 67 (1987).
42. The effectiveness of international adjudicatory institutions other than the
International Court of Justice are also Iimited by compliance problems. See generally
CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987) (discussing the
development of various international adjudicatory bodies including the European and
American courts of human rights, the European Court of Justice, and special tribunals); and
COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 87, 110 (M. K. Bulterrnan
& M. Kuijer eds., 1996).
43. Final Act, supra note 7, at 1125-26. See generally supra note 7 for an explanation of
the Uruguay Round.
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specifies that parties to a dispute must first attempt to resolve their
differences through consultations with each other;" H unsuccessful, and if
both parties agree, they can request good offices conciliation or mediation
from the Director General of the World Trade Ozganization.r" If a
sertlernent continues to be illusive, the corn.plainant can request a three
member panel to adjudicate the disputer" The losing party may appeal
issues of law to a permanent appellate body;" Once the adjudication process
has run its course, a final decision identifying whether or not an infraction
has occurred becomes binding when adopted by the membership of the
WTO. This is now automatic unless all members, including the winning
party, agree that it should not be adopted (a most unlikely possibrlityj.:"
After a decision, the losing party is required to comply with the decision or,
in the alternative, offer compensation.t"
Once the WTO authoritatively identifies an infraction, the second hurdle
to international compliance-the problem of enforcement-is also likely to
be overcome by resorting to the WTO's dispute resolution system. In the
first place, because the continuing integrity of the international trading
order depends upon the willingness of countries to abide by WTO
determinations, voluntary compliance is likely to be much higher than if
another body was used to adjudicate environmental disputes. Even under
the older and much weaker GATT system.i? the vast majority of panel
decisions were honored.51
To the extent that a conunitment to the multilateral trading system
alone, is not sufficient to ensure compliance, the WTO employs a uniquely
powerful system. of sanctions which could be used to enforce international
environmental standards. The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides
that if a party is judged not to be in compliance with WTO rules, and does
not remedy the situation or pay compensation to the winning party, the
winning party can seek permission from the WTO to withdraw trade
44. Id. art. 4.
45. Id. art. 5
46. Id. art. 6.
47. Id. art. 7.
48. Final Act, supra note 7, art. 5, para. 4 (relating to DSB reports); ide art. 17, para. 14
(pertaining to appellate review).
49. Id. art. 21.
50. See supra note 7 for an explanation of the distinction between the GAIT and WTO
systems.
51. See Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile ofGA ITDispute Settlement Cases:
1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 10 (1993). Of 207 "legally valid complaints" arising
between 1948 and 198.9, 67 resulted in rulings, Of these, 90% "ended with a positive
outcome." Id. More specifically, "just over half the violation rulings achieved full
compliance directly, two-thirds resulted in full compliance somehow, and nine out of ten
produced a worthwhile positive result." Id.
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concessions previously given to the loser.52 These can be very costly, and
can be strategically targeted against specific politically powerful national
industries of the recalcitrant parties. Thus, in addition to facing
international pressures to comply with environmental treaty obligations, the
system is designed so that targeted industries place additional internal
pressures on their governments to comply. Because such sanctions are
legalized, and therefore deemed legitimate, the loser is unlikely to retaliate
in kind, thus averting the potential for a trade war.
One remedial scheme would be to allow countries to pursue claims aimed
at redressing the competitive disadvantage that their local industry faces in
international trade as a result of lower production costs in countries whose
environmental laws do not measure up to WTO requirements.53 In contrast
to most trade disputes where particular tariffs or regulations are alleged to
illegally disadvantage a limited number of products from specific countries,
failure by a country to adhere to basic international environmental
production standards would disadvantage industrial competitors from
countries all around the world. Under the present system, each of these
countries would have the right to bring an action.t" and if compliance was
not forthcoming, all would have the right to compensation.55 The force of
such broad-based, active, and legally sanctioned opposition would make
compliance even rnore likely than it presently is in traditional trade cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the WTO is given primary responsibility for overseeing
the negotiation and!or enforcement of global environmental agreements,
the inherent connection between many trade and environmental issues is
inevitably thrusting the organization into some involvement with the world
of international environmental regulation. As I have noted, the need to
create a level regulatory playing field upon which international trade can
52. See Final Act, supra note 7, art. 22.
53. For a more complete discussion of the relationship between competitive advantage
and lax environmental standards, see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. Other
remedial schemes are also possible. For example, a regulatory approach where a schedule of
fines is tied to the severity of the environmental infraction could be implemented.
54. See generally Jackson, supra note 12, at 1227, 1253, 1272-73.
55. How compensation should be calculated if such a remedial scheme were to be
adopted is a complex and highly technical question that goes beyond the topic of this Article.
Many of the same questions that come up in the consideration of implementing
countervailing duties in the event of national subsidization currently would have to be
considered. See generally JOSEPH E. PATI1S0N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTY LAWS (1990) (outlining the issues and complexity of determining whether subsidization
has ocurred and to what extent). For my own discussion of the problem, see generally
Strauss, supra note 9.
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take place converges trade and environmental policy. In addition, as I have
also noted, trade rules are also impacted by multilateral environmental
agreements as well as unilateral attempts to influence offshore
environmental policy.t" The real question, therefore, is not whether WTO
practices must somehow be coordinated with environrnental policies, but
rather the relative role that the WTO will play in creating and administering
environm.ental policy. My purpose in this Article is to show that there are
major advantages to giving the WTO a primary role.
To be clear, I am not proposing precisely how the responsibility for
negotiating and enforcing various international environmental agreements
should be allocated between the WTO and other international organizations
with errvironrnental responsibilities. Nor am I specifying a more general
architecture for the structure of the relationship between the WTO and
these organizations. I am sure a wide variety of formulas would be
workable.57 My only message is that whatever structure is created, that
structure should be designed so that it will take advantage of the WTO's
unique negotiating and compliance machinery.
I agree with Alan Miller. Weare clearly in a new era, an era where
private capital flows are eclipsing government regulation as the dominant
force driving the global economy. The challenge for those of us who think
about regulatory schemes is, therefore, to creatively engineer our limited
regulatory resources so that public benefits lIlay be maximized. In this
regard, Illy intended contribution to this symposium has been to suggest
how the very potent resources of the WTO might be channeled so as to help
further the well-being of the global environment,
56. See supra text accompanying notes 11-18.
57. As has been suggested, it might even be wise to establish a new global
environmental organization with broad oversight powers. See supra note 6. My point is that
this or any other global environmental organization should be constitutionally connected to
the WTO in such a way so as to allow for the WTO's negotiating and enforcement benefits
to be taken advantage of.
